Another big week in the world of CFIUS, international trade and cyber security. We’ll start with the story that deserves far more attention than it’s getting.

Atlanta ransomware attacks: For more than a week, components of the city’s critical infrastructure—with the noted exception of the 911 system and water purification facilities—have been dealing with a ransomware attack. The hackers, a group known as SamSam, likely penetrated municipal systems through one of several public-facing networks and demanded approx. $51,000 to release the systems.

Similar attacks have yielded the hackers more than $800,000 in ransom payouts this year alone, with victimized hospitals and other groups that could not afford downtime opting to pay the relatively low cost to unlock their systems.

Baltimore ransomware attack: In Baltimore, hackers took down the computer-aided dispatch system on Sunday, compromising Baltimore’s 911 and 311 systems. Baltimore has characterized the attack as the subject of an ongoing investigation, and has provided few details on the nature of the hack or whether ransom was paid.

The sheer number of attack vectors and the increasing ease of hackers to infiltrate them virtually ensures that these incidents will continue. With high-profile issues, such as electoral system integrity, occupying much of DHS’s attention, a lower-profile attack of a local government’s system will not generate much attention or mobilize much of a response. For a group like SamSam, which currently seems to choose lower-profile targets and only ask for modest ransom, 2018 looks to be a profitable year.

You catch more flies with tariffs: Reports out of various sources indicate that the administration’s aggressive trade actions may be bringing China to the bargaining table. It was reported that the administration was quietly discussing solutions to trade issues with China, and that Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin was “cautiously hopeful” that a deal could be brokered. One complaint China had registered following the announcement of the trade actions was the lack of any specific list of requested actions for China to take. This list was reportedly delivered late last week and includes such items as a reduction of Chinese tariffs on U.S. automobiles, more Chinese purchases of U.S. semiconductors and greater access to China’s financial sector by American companies.

A failure to plan on my part:. Several outlets are reporting that the Trump administration is considering declaring a national emergency to enable it to invoke the International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977. This would provide the administration authority to impose a broad range of economic countermeasures against China. The New York Times has a great piece quoting a very knowledgeable source on the issue. My more in-depth discussion of this piece is available here. 

Life by a thousand cuts: The administration locked down a bilateral trade agreement with South Korea this week, and initial reports indicate a big win for the administration, if the President Trump doesn’t reject his own trade deal. Components of the deal include imposing a quota on South Korea steel imports to the U.S., lifting limitations on U.S. auto sales in S. Korea, and limiting South Korea from devaluing its currency. U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer described the agreement as “three separate agreements that define a relationship.” While the administration has been clear on its opposition to multilateral trade agreements, including NAFTA , it is probably fair to ask how the government would administer dozens of unilateral trade agreements, each with separate terms, without significantly increasing various agencies’ budgets and manpower.

And yet: That last question admittedly put the cart before the horse. It was noted that the agreement with South Korea is the product of the exceptional geopolitical circumstances, where neither side could afford protracted trade negotiations given the impending séance between Trump and Kim in which they *may* seek to revive a very dead relationship, if it’s not a ploy Other countries have “reacted coolly” to the concept of renegotiations amid threats of tariffs, with French President Emmanuel Macron commenting, “We talk about everything, in principle, with a friendly country that respects the rules of the W.T.O. We talk about nothing, in principle, when it is with a gun to our head.” In fairness, only the most plain-spoken politician could pull off an admission like, “True, we were taking advantage of America, but now that they’re threatening us we’ll back off.” Still, no need to warm up hundreds of extra seats at Commerce and Treasury just yet.

Roguish state charm: It has long been assumed in some circles, if not confirmed, that despite a number of complications in their relations with the rogue nation, China and Russia benefit from North Korea’s misbehavior, as North Korea enables the pair to extract concessions from the West in exchange for efforts to curb the regime’s misbehavior. China’s willingness to meet with Kim a week after Trump announced aggressive trade actions against China is no coincidence.

The devil’s advocate is in the false dichotomy: An article at Foreign Policy Journal properly points out that the slowdown in Chinese investment in the U.S. likely owes to a general slowdown in Chinese outbound investment. In rebutting a series of articles attributing the slowdown to Trump’s protectionist policies alone, this article takes the other side of the dichotomy, when the proper cause almost assuredly is not one or the other, but both, along with many others.